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STAFF STUDY

1. PROBLEM: To ascertain the most advantageous operational base for the 25X1A2g unit.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

25X1A2q 2 What f

a. That for political reasons will be unable to operate from

25X1A6a 🛖

25X1C8a

25X1C8a

b. That the will organize a complete unit and will operate from

a permanent base in Western Europe or the

- c. That CHALICE will provide the technical support personnel and equipment to man the unit.
 - d. That cost of establishing a base will be borne by CHALICE.
- e. That will be required to conduct prolonged staging operations at whatever base is selected.
 - 3. DISCUSSION:

Available Bases or Areas:

25X1A6a



ADVANTAGES

- (1) Base facilities now available, in place, and ready for use.
- (2) U-2 already exposed in that area and operational procedures have been established and tested.

25X1A6a

- (3) Best terminal weather in second on year round basis.
- (4) Logistics system established and functioning.

DISADVANTAGES

(1) The US Government would probably take the blame for any overflights from this base due to our previous activity there. (This could be helped by 25X1C8a advertising fact of acquisition and operation of U-2 aircraft).

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(2) Aircraft would be operating within the Russian radar net.

25X1A6a

usafe which would necessitate their coordination on all activities. It is felt that with this type unit and activities CHALICE should avoid involvement of Usaf authority as much as possible.

25X1X7

ADVANTAGES

(1) US Government would likely escape blame for any overflights originating from

25X1X7 25X1X7

(2) A base in would not be within the Russian radar net.

DISADVANTAGES

- (1) Any base selected would require major construction and modification 25X1C8a prior to use by the unit. (\$100,000 to \$200,000) and would require approximately 4 months from start of construction.
 - (2) Would require special logistic handling and procedures to support the unit which would pinpoint US interest in the unit.
 - (3) Would require new operational procedures to be laid on with local and area operations officials and with filter centers for radar suppression which, in turn, would considerably widen knowledge of the U-2

25X1A2g 25X1A6a

(4) A base in would be within Russian radar net.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

- 25X1X7 of the unit being located in either would accrue to the project as a result ability to deny responsibility or knowledge of the flight if a protest is made.
 - b. That some disadvantage would accrue in the nature of financial outlay of some \$200,000, revamp of supply and operational procedures and some loss in security in that a greater number of people would become more

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25X1A6a could be used as a temporary training base and That 25X1A2g staging base, pending completion of a permanent base. d. That in order to take maximum advantage of the main object in 25X1C8a in the U-2 program i.e. US denial of overflight responinclusion of the sibility, the unit must conduct operations from the or other non US 25X1C8a 25X1X7 controlled areas. 5. RECOMMENDATION: 25X1A2g unit be permanently based at for training That the 25X1A6a purposes and operate from or other bases that are not under US control. 25X1X7